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Abstract 
This study uses agency theory to test whether the demand for quality-differentiated audits by listed Chinese 
companies is systematically associated with changes in ownership structure, which is characterized by the 
dominance of government and institutional owners in a transitional economy. Our empirical test results are 
supportive of agency theory. Specifically, we find that a decrease of government shares and a corresponding 
increase of institutional shares lead to a general increase in the demand for higher-quality audits in China's 
stock market. However, the influence of individual shareholders on a firm's auditor-choice decisions appears 
insignificant. Our results suggest that in the absence of institutional features typically found in free-market 
economies that provide incentives for managers to supply credible accounting information via quality audits, 
the introduction of large institutional blockholders can be a good alternative for a transitional economy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The early 2000s has witnessed a renewed interest in the quality of corporate financial reporting. The 
Enron debacle and other scandals have raised serious questions about the quality and reliability of 
audited information. The concerns of the resultant Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 regarding the 
proximity of the auditor-management relationship highlight the importance of auditing as an 
important governance mechanism through which shareholders can seek to monitor management. 
In this paper, we use agency theory to explain whether a firm's demand for audit quality is a function 
of changes in the proportion of shares held by government versus institutional and individual 
owners in China. As will be explained later, high government ownership of shares results in severe 
agency problems and weakens the desire for credible accounting information, and thus audit quality. 
We, therefore, hypothesize that a decrease of shares that are owned by government agencies and a 
corresponding increase of shares that are held by institutional and individual entities will lead to a 
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general increase in the demand for higher-quality audits in China's stock market. 
 
Agency theory suggests that a firm's ownership structure affects its demand for external auditing 
(DeFond 1992; Francis and Wilson 1988; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986). When share ownership becomes more dispersed, direct monitoring by 
shareholders becomes more costly, and greater reliance on the audit as a mechanism of governance 
to mitigate agency problems is expected. When share ownership is concentrated, there are two 
conflicting views about accounting information quality. One view is that, as Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) claim, when ownership concentration increases to a level where an owner obtains effective 
control of the firm, the controlling owners can use earnings management to expropriate minority 
shareholders. This will reduce the controlling owners' demand for quality audits. Another view, as 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest, is that an increase in the holdings of the owner-largest 
shareholder reduces agency costs and thus, the need to manage earnings in order to alleviate 
contractual constraints. In this case, the controlling owners will be more motivated to improve 
earnings informativeness via independent auditing. 
 
High levels of government ownership of shares are a unique feature of ownership structure in 
China's stock markets as well as in markets of many transitional economies (Krivogorsky 2000). As 
will be explained later, high levels of government ownership in China create a series of agency 
problems, such as ineffective corporate governance that directly results in poor firm performance 
(Qi et al. 2000; Xu and Wang 1999), and little demand for independent auditing to supply quality 
accounting information (DeFond et al. 2000; Wang et al. 2005). Over the past few years, the Chinese 
government has undertaken measures to reduce its holdings in listed companies through the sale of 
state shares to other groups of investors. For example, the government suspended IPOs and rights 
offering by listed companies in May 2005 to make way for reforms to float government-owned, 
nontradable shares (People's Daily Online 2006). As a result, the proportion of state shares has 
declined over the years, while the proportions of institutional and tradable A-shares have risen. In 
this paper, we investigate whether these changes in ownership structure are associated with quality-
differentiated audit services. Specifically, we examine whether changes in the proportion of shares 
held by government versus institutional and individual investors affect the demand for quality 
audits. Audit quality is proxied by auditor size, which is constructed as a ratio of the total client 
assets of the new and the old auditors (DeAngelo 1981; DeFond 1992; Francis and Wilson 1988), and 
auditor differentiation is captured by comparing the size of the new auditor with that of the old 
auditor in the year of auditor change. 
 
We test our hypothesis by analyzing 130 voluntary auditor switches over the 19972005 period, after 
excluding several categories of switching companies. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that 
the demand for quality audits increases as a result of an increase in institutional shares and a 
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decrease in state shares. However, we find little evidence in support of a positive association 
between auditor choice and the proportion of tradable Ashares owned by domestic individual 
investors. Our results are robust to control for other agency variables and to alternative definitions 
of audit quality and ownership level. 
 
This paper provides empirical evidence that supports the efficient monitoring explanation for the 
relationship between institutional ownership and audit quality in a setting typical for many 
transitional economies, but different from those in most Western countries. Prior studies (e.g., Chow 
1982; DeFond 1992; GuI et al. 2002) have typically examined the relationship between managerial 
ownership (as a proxy for a firm's ownership structure) and audit quality in a diffused ownership 
setting. However, the use of managerial ownership does not fit the Chinese context, due to 
differences in the level of ownership concentration and in the associated type of agency problems. 
Moreover, unlike managers in the West, managerial ownership in China is relatively low. In contrast 
to the situation in Western economies, Chinese ownership structures are characterized by the control 
of two groups of shareholders: government and institutions. 
 
Wang et al. (2005) compare the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with non-SOEs in their choice of 
auditors in China. They find that SOEs and, in particular, local SOEs are more likely than non-SOEs 
to hire small local auditors. However, in regions where the institutional environment is better 
developed, SOEs and non-SOEs tend to make more similar auditor choices. Different from their 
study that examines how different types of ownership are associated with a particular class of the 
auditor, we study how the annual "change" in ownership structure affects the "change" in quality-
differentiated audit services. We use agency theory to explain that, when the institutional ownership 
of a firm increases, the firm is likely to switch from a lower-quality auditor to a higher-quality 
auditor. To our knowledge, no published research has examined the association between changes 
in ownership structure and changes in auditor choice in transitional economies. Evidence on the 
role of government in auditor choice decisions is a useful contribution to the literature because little 
is known about the relationship between government dominance of share ownership and the 
motivation of firms for quality-differentiated audit services. Moreover, our results provide a useful 
reference for other transitional economies such as Russia and Vietnam whose organizational form 
is also characterized by insider ownership and government control (Krivogorsky 2000; Wright and 
Nguyen 2000). 
 
Given that emerging markets and transitional economies are keen to build a credible accounting 
profession and efficient capital markets, our results are rich in policy implications. For example, we 
provide empirical support, from the accounting perspective, for the reduction of government shares 
in listed companies to improve corporate governance and firm performance. Moreover, our results 
indicate that in the absence of institutional features typically found in developed capital markets, 
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such as auditor litigation and corporate governance mechanisms that provide incentives for 
managers to supply credible accounting information via quality audits, the maintenance of large 
institutional blockholders can be a good formula for transition. Finally, although our findings 
pertain to China, empirical evidence of how changes in ownership structure affect the demand for 
quality audits should provide a useful reference for other transitional economies with high 
government ownership. Our results illustrate the need for policy makers in other transitional 
economies to understand how the government-concentrated share structure provides perverse 
incentives for managers to reduce both accounting information and audit quality before prescribing 
a comprehensive set of rules and regulations for corporate reporting. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the institutional 
background of China's stock markets and develops the research hypothesis. Section III describes the 
research methodology. Section IV discusses the empirical results, and Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
 
The Chinese stock market became a significant vehicle for ownership reform of the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) after the establishment of stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen in the early 
1990s. The number of listed companies, trading volume, and total market capitalization has grown 
rapidly since then. For example, the total number of listed companies increased from 50 in 1992 to 
1,378 in 2005. In less than 15 years, China's stock market has grown to become the second largest in 
Asia behind Japan, with market capitalization close to U.S.$500 billion. During this period, about 
U.S.$100 billion has been raised through initial public offerings. However, tradable market 
capitalization as a percentage of GDP in China is only about 17 percent, compared with 60 percent 
in other emerging markets (Farrell and Lund 2006). Nevertheless, once the recent share reform that 
aims at converting nontradable shares into tradable listed shares has been completed, China's 
market capitalization as a percentage of GDP is expected to increase to a level comparable to other 
emerging markets. 
 
To be eligible for listing, Chinese companies must report three consecutive years of profits for an 
initial public offering. To raise additional capital through a rights issue, listed companies should 
have maintained a minimum level of profit or ROE, and the threshold of a rights issue has been 
gradually refined over the years. For example, the 1996 guideline required a ROE of at least 10 
percent in each of previous three years to qualify for a rights issue. The 1999 guideline required a 
three-year average ROE of at least 10 percent and an ROE of at least 6 percent in each of previous 
three years. The 2001 guideline required a three-year average ROE of at least 6 percent, which is 
calculated based on net income excluding extraordinary items. Companies that report three 
consecutive years of losses will be de-listed. Listed Chinese companies issue three major classes of 
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snares: state shares, institutional (legal persons) shares, and tradable Á-shares. State shares are 
owned by government agencies (including central government ministries and commissions, 
national industry companies, state asset management bureaus, and local government bureaus), and 
state-owned enterprises. Institutional shares are held by domestic legal entities and nonbank 
financial institutions, including securities firms, trust and investment companies, mutual funds, and 
state-private mixed companies. State shares cannot be traded, but institutional shares can be traded 
in blocks in a designated market. Tradable A-shares are held and traded mostly by transient 
individual investors in stock exchanges. As individual ownership is widely dispersed, individual 
investors do not have much influence in most listed companies. 
 
In line with the government's objective of improving nonperforming state assets, China has 
undertaken measures from year to year to relax its control over corporate affairs by selling off state 
shares in listed companies (People's Daily 2005). As a result, the proportion of state shares has 
declined over the years. To illustrate changes in corporate ownership, we track down 480 companies 
that were continuously listed on the two stock exchanges throughout the period 1996-2005 and 
report the results in Table 1. 
 
Panel A of Table 1 indicates that the number and the percentage of companies with 51 percent or 
higher levels of state ownership declined from 90 (19 percent) in 1996 to 35 (7 percent) in 2005. The 
overall ownership mix by year (Panel B) shows a similar decreasing trend for state shares. In contrast 
to the trend displayed by the state holdings, the percentage of firms with A-share owners has 
consistently increased over the years. The level of institutional ownership has not significantly 
increased over the years because of an offset of increases and decreases in institutional shares. On 
average, the state, institutional investors and individual A-share owners respectively controlled 16 
percent, 39 percent, and 42 percent of total stock from 1996 to 2005. 
 
High levels of government ownership create a number of agency problems (Gao 1996; Qian 1996). 
The first is the "absence of principal" problem. The principal of state shares is the state, which 
represents all Chinese people. The agents are multi-tiered state controlling authorities (i.e., central 
government, line ministries and commissions, local governments, and SOE managers). According 
to the classical agency theory, agents are supposed to serve the principal's interest. However, due to 
the lack of a principal or the ambiguity of property rights, no agent in this chain of principal-agent 
relationships has an adequate incentive to pursue profit maximization for the real principal (the 
Chinese people). The state assumes the role as representative of the people and acts as the principal 
(owner) on behalf of the public in delegating enterprise managers (agents) to perform daily 
operational activities. However, the controlling authorities, i.e., central government line ministries 
and local governments, which exercise de facto ownership rights over the enterprises, do not bear 
any residual risks over the control and use of an enterprise's assets. Any residual claims (profits) are 
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socialized and risks (losses) are simply passed on to the public via budgetary subsidies and 
government loans. 
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The second agency problem relates to the principal's ineffective monitoring of the agents. The state 
relies on its control over the board of directors to preserve the value of state properties. However, as 
many board members who represent the state's interest are appointed and paid by the local 
government according to their administrative rankings rather than their ability to perform (Zhou 
and Wang 2000; Xu and Wang 1999), they may not have sufficient managerial ability to monitor the 
management's divergent behavior. Moreover, the preferences of the local government do not 
necessarily coincide with those of the state. The third agency problem stems from the government's 
political influence on corporate decisions. The government, through its control over the board of 
directors, may divert managerial objectives away from profit maximization and toward such 
objectives as infrastructure development and employment and social welfare maximization 
(Williamson 1985). 
 
In sum, controlling government entities lack sufficient managerial incentives to monitor divergent 
management behavior to promote the best interest of the public. From an accounting perspective, 
their controlling ownership interest means the government-entity owners are able to control the 
production of a firm's accounting information and its reporting policies. Given the current 
regulatory profit requirement for additional capital raising by listed companies, government owners 
have strong incentives to pressure management to report favorable earnings, but little regard for 
audit quality (Chan et al. 2006; DeFond et al. 2000). Moreover, unlike other groups of investors, the 
government has adequate power to require whatever information is needed from the listed 
companies. The lack of reliance on publicly released financial reports for performance evaluation 
reduces the government's need for independent auditing (Klassen 1997). 
 
In contrast, market-oriented economic entities and institutions act more like commercial enterprises 
than government agencies. They have a lesser degree of government intervention because they have 
much more autonomy (Groves et al. 1994). Unlike government officials, representatives of 
institutional shareholders are elected to the board of directors by different institutions, act more like 
businessmen than bureaucrats or politicians, and are paid according to their real managerial efforts. 
Because of the size of their holdings and economies of scale in information gathering, 
representatives of institutional shareholders have strong incentives to maximize firm value to 
promote the best interests of the institutions that they represent (Pound 1988; Bushee 1998; Shleifer 
and Vishny 1986). For example, Jin (2005) suggests that dividend-averse institutional investors have 
tax incentives to let firms adapt their payout policies to the interests of their institutional 
shareholders. The presence of institutional ownership has also been found to mitigate managerial 
incentives to report aggressively (Dechow et al. 1996; Koh 2003; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 1998). 
Moreover, these representatives have diverse professional backgrounds and are better equipped 
with authority and expertise. For example, they can vote on important issues such as the 
appointment of the auditor and can also bring significant pressure to bear on management to ensure 
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that an effective corporate governance structure is in place. Many studies (e.g., Claessens and 
Djankov 1999; Qi et al. 2000; Pound 1988; Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Xu and Wang 1999) find a strong 
positive relation between the concentration of institutional ownership and corporate performance 
in both transitional and market economies, and attribute it to the effect of better monitoring. Prior 
studies (e.g., Warfield et al. 1995) also indicate that the higher the holdings of institutions and 
blockholders, the smaller the discretionary accruals and the greater the informativeness of earnings. 
This suggests that, unlike government-entity owners, institutional investors are likely to prefer 
credible financial information and hire quality auditors to improve earnings informativeness and 
market returns (Teoh and Wong 1993). 
 
Under current Chinese regulations, at least 25 percent of the shares outstanding must be sold to the 
general public. However, the vast majority of individual investors are relatively small and their 
representation on boards of directors is extremely low (Xu and Wang 1999). Consequently, 
individual shareholders may not be able to closely monitor management. This is consistent with the 
results of prior studies (Xu and Wang 1999; Qi et al. 2000), which find that the influence of individual 
shareholders on a firm's profitability is often irrelevant because of their incapability of monitoring 
managerial performance. Minority shareholders also lack the ability to claim damages due to the 
release of false information by listed companies, as there are no adequate corporate governance 
mechanisms to protect their interests and the litigation costs that are involved are relatively high. 
Furthermore, most individual investors in China buy stocks for speculative purposes rather than 
dividend income or long-term growth (Xu and Wang 1999). This short investment horizon deters 
individual investors from incurring monitoring costs and controlling actions taken by managers. 
Therefore, although diffused ownership by individual investors theoretically provides the basis for 
a demand for credible financial information via quality audits, transient individual investors may 
not have adequate incentive to closely monitor management. 
 
Prior studies frequently attribute the poor performance of listed companies in China to their 
ownership structure, which gives rise to severe agency problems originating from the ambiguity of 
property rights that is associated with government ownership (e.g., Qi et al. 2000; Gao 1996; Xu and 
Wang 1999). These studies find that the firm's profitability is positively (negatively) correlated with 
the fraction of shares that are held by institutional (government) owners. Regulators in China have 
taken measures to deal with nonperforming state assets through the sale of state shares in listed 
companies to market-oriented economic entities and institutions. As indicated earlier, such 
measures have brought about ownership changes in China. A change in ownership structure is also 
paralleled by a change in the composition of the board of directors.1 It is expected that this change 
will affect the quality of auditing that is demanded by listed companies in China. Therefore, we 
summarize our directional hypothesis as follows: 
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Ceteris paribus, the higher the increase (decrease) in the fraction of institutional and individual A-
shares (state shares), the higher the demand for audit quality. 
 
III. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Sample Data 
To test the hypothesis, we hand-collected ownership data and client-firm characteristics from the 
annual reports of listed companies that changed their ownership structure and auditors between 
1997 and 2005, as we focused on examining the relationships between these changes. This 
information is available from the CD-ROM database published by the Securities Times and the 
Shanghai securities News. The database contains 482 firm-year observations that involve changes in 
both client-firm ownership level and auditor choice. As auditor change can be driven by both agency 
and nonagency factors, we exclude the following categories of switching firms from the sample in 
order to reduce noise (thus yield more powerful tests) and avoid the distraction of uncontrollable 
variables. First, we exclude 340 involuntary auditor switches resulting from either license 
suspension of the previous auditor due to irregularities, or from the merger of the incumbent auditor 
with other auditors, because these switches are not caused by endogenous changes in client 
characteristics but by exogenous events. second, we eliminate two companies that changed auditors 
more than twice during a three-year period, as these switches often relate to opinion shopping. Third, 
we omit six companies that received severe (adverse or disclaimer) audit opinions in the year prior 
to auditor switch, as their financial information is deemed unreliable for statistical analysis (DeFond 
1992). Finally, we leave out four financial institutions, because these companies are very dissimilar 
to others in terms of accounting rules, auditor choice (they are required to hire international 
accounting firms), and corporate governance (La Porta et al. 2000). Therefore, our final sample is 
composed of 130 auditor changes that are motivated by agency-related factors. 
 
Regression Model 
As already discussed, a change in ownership structure may give rise to demand for quality-
differentiated audits. We use the ratio of the total client assets of the new and old auditors to proxy 
for the change in audit firm size, as size based on client assets is a good surrogate for audit quality 
(DeAngelo 1981; DeFond et al. 2000; Reynolds and Francis 2001). A ratio above one indicates a move 
to a larger auditor. (We test two alternative surrogates for audit quality in the sensitivity analysis 
section.) We estimate the following regression model to test the relationship between changes in 
client firm ownership structure and changes in audit quality by listed Chinese companies. 
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The dependent variable, δQuality, is denned as the natural logarithm of the ratio of combined assets 
of listed companies audited by the new auditor to that by the old auditor in the year of auditor 
change (DeAngelo 1981; DeFond 1992; Francis and Wilson 1988; Johnson and Lys 1990; Reynolds 
and Francis 2001).2 Changes in ownership structure are measured as changes in the percentage of 
shares held by the state, institutions, and individual A-share holders between year t and t - 1, 
respectively. We predict that the coefficient b1 will be negative and that b2 and b3 will be positive. 
 
Six agency-related variables are used to control for the effect of changes in agency costs on auditor 
choice.3 Increases in client firm size can be expected to increase agency costs due to the increased 
remoteness of principals from the observation of agents' actions (Palmrose, 1984). The larger the size 
of the client firm, the greater the magnitude of wealth transfers (agency costs). As client size is 
significantly related to auditor choice (DeFond 1992), a ΔSize variable, measured as the percentage 
change in total assets between year t and t - 1, is included in the model. 
 
Another type of contractual relationship with the potential for divergence of interests is the 
relationship between debt holders and shareholders. As the amount of debt increases, the potential 
amount of the wealth transfer away from debt holders increases, which results in a greater incentive 
for such transfers and a greater demand for monitoring (Chow 1982; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; 
Jensen and Meckling 1976). We thus include a ΔLeverage variable in the model to capture the 
potential wealth transfers (i.e., agency costs). This variable is measured as the change in the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets between year t and t - 1. 
 
When ownership is separated from management, conflicts of interests often arise between 
shareholders and managers. Shareholders may contract with management under arrangements that 
attempt to mitigate the extent of conflicts of interests between the two groups. One such 
arrangement is to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. This alignment is often 
tied to accounting numbers. However, the determination of accounting numbers necessarily 
involves judgment and discretion, which gives the manager an opportunity to manipulate the 
numbers via short-term accruals (DeFond 1992; Healy 1985). One mechanism for enhancing the 
credibility of management-prepared accounting numbers is to hire a quality auditor. We use 
ΔAccrual, which is measured as the change in the ratio of short-term accruals to total assets between 
year t and t - 1, to measure the effect of vulnerability to manipulation on the demand for monitoring. 
We expect the coefficient b6 to be positive. 
This is the post-printed version of an article. The final published version is available at Journal of International Accounting Research 6:1 (2007); doi: 10.2308/jiar.2007.6.1.19 
ISSN 1542-6297 (Print) / 1558-8025 (Online)  
Copyright © American Accounting Association. Published online: Jan 2010
11 
 
 
Prior studies (e.g., DeFond et al. 2000; Schwarte and Menon 1985) find that financially distressed 
firms are more likely than healthy firms to make income-increasing accounting changes and hire an 
accommodating auditor to mask these changes. We use changes in the return on equity (ΔROE) 
prior to auditor changes to control for the effect of the firm's financial condition on auditor choice. 
 
As with size, the complexity of an organization increases the number of agency relationships. The 
greater the complexity and diversity of an organization's activities and operations, the greater the 
difficulty in monitoring the divergent behavior of agents that are remote from the principals 
(Palmrose 1984). Accordingly, we include the number of subsidiaries (natural log form) in the model 
to capture the organizational diversity and geographical dispersion. 
 
In a society like China, where business transactions are relationship based, changes in key 
management positions can create new principal-agent contractual agreements and trigger 
alterations in the auditor-client relationship. Previous studies find that changes in management are 
a significant factor in auditor changes (e.g., Beattie and Fearnley 1995). We use a dummy variable, 
Management, to measure this effect by taking a value of one if there are changes in key management 
positions (e.g., the board chairman, the president and CEO) in year r, and O otherwise. Finally, as 
the sample covers auditor changes from 1997 to 2005, we include eight Year dummies to control for 
inter-temporal differences. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Univariate Test Results 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and univariate tests of differences in means and medians by the 
direction of auditor switch. The table shows that of the 130 companies which voluntarily switched 
their auditors, 71 switched to larger auditors, and 59 switched to smaller auditors. Companies with 
upgrade switches have, on average, greater decreases in the percentage of state shares (-6.92 percent 
for means and -1.08 for medians) than companies with downgrade switches (-2.50 percent for means 
and 0.00 for medians), and the differences are significant at the 10 percent level. Companies with an 
increase (decrease) in the proportion of institutional shares are more likely to switch to a larger 
(smaller) auditor (4.08 percent versus -0.29 percent for means). Other statistics suggest that when 
the number of subsidiaries becomes larger, companies are significantly more likely to make an 
upgrade auditor switch. These univariate results are directionally supportive of the association of 
changes in ownership structure with changes in auditor choice. 
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Multivariate Analysis Results 
To avoid multicollinearity problems arising from the high correlation (-0.961) between ΔState and 
ΔInstitutions if these two variables are simultaneously included in the model, we run two separate 
OLS regressions and report the results in Table 3.4 
 
Both models are significant at the 5 percent level, which indicates a strong relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. Most of the coefficient signs in the models are in the 
hypothesized directions. As predicted by the hypothesis and indicated by the significantly negative 
(positive) coefficient for the ΔState (ΔInstitutions) variable, companies with greater decreases in the 
proportion of state shares and those with greater increases in the fraction of institutional shares are 
more likely to demand higher-quality audits. The coefficient on ΔIndividuals is insignificant at the 
conventional levels in both models, which provides no evidence that greater ownership by 
individual A-share owners leads to an improved preference for audit quality. Individual A-
shareholders experience the traditional free-rider problem that they have neither the incentive nor 
the capability to monitor managerial performance and thus have little regard for auditor 
differentiation. One control variable, Subsidiary, is also significantly positive at the 5 percent level. 
This supports the proposition that the greater the complexity and geographical dispersion of an 
organization's activities and operations, the greater the difficulty in monitoring the divergent 
behavior of agents that are remote from the principals, thus the greater the demand for reputable 
auditors to monitor the management's actions. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We perform the following additional analyses on the dependent and explanatory variables and 
summarize the results in Table 4. First, we test whether the results are robust to alternative 
definitions of the dependent variable. In this regard, we rerun the regressions by using two 
alternative surrogates for audit quality: auditor affiliation and auditor dependence. In the affiliation 
model, we classify auditors into either top 10 (= 1) or non-top 10 (= 0) groups based on the total client 
assets audited, as top 10 auditors in China are of higher quality than their counterparts (DeFond et 
al. 2000).5 Thus, a change from a non-top 10 auditor to a top 10 auditor suggests the demand for a 
higher-quality auditor. In the dependence model, we consider the economic dependence of auditors 
upon their clients and compute this dependence as the difference between the ratios of the switching 
client firm's assets to the total client assets of the old auditor, minus the same ratio for the new 
auditor (DeFond 1992). A positive difference suggests a preference for an independent auditor. Table 
4 (Tests 1a and 1b) reports the results of regressing these two alternative surrogates of audit quality. 
 
Second, we define the dependent variable as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the combined sales 
(instead of assets) of the client firms audited by the new auditor to that by the old auditor in the year 
of auditor change. The results of replicating Table 3 are reported in Test 2 of Table 4. Finally, to 
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further explore the association between audit quality and the proportion of shares owned by 
individual investors, we focus on 33 firm-year observations where tradable A-share investors hold 
a dominant stake and report the results in Table 4 (Test 3). 
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All of the sensitivity test results point to a single conclusion regarding the experimental variables. 
Tests 1 to 2 provide the consistent result that changes in share ownership are associated with changes 
in audit quality. Specifically, the higher the increase (decrease) in the fraction of institutional (state) 
shares, the higher the demand for audit quality. One control variable, Subsidiary, is significantly 
positive in most of the tests. This is consistent with agency theory, which states that as a firm 
increases in complexity and diversity, the number of agency relationships also increases, thus 
creating a greater need for owners to monitor the actions of managers through independent auditing 
(Palmrose 1984). 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Recent audit failures and accounting scandals in the capital markets of China and the U.S. have 
resulted in increasing concern over corporate governance and audit quality. Over the years, China 
has gradually relaxed governmental control over corporate affairs through ownership reform. That 
reform has brought about changes in firm ownership structure. This paper analyzes the effects of 
changes in the ownership structure of listed Chinese companies on their voluntary hiring of quality 
auditors. We hypothesize that a decrease of state shares and a corresponding increase of institutional 
and tradable A-shares will lead to a greater need for independent auditing. The empirical test results 
based on pooled, cross-sectional time series data are supportive of the hypothesized association 
between changes in ownership structure and changes in audit quality, except that there is little 
evidence of a positive association between audit quality and the proportion of shares held by 
individual A-shareholders. These results suggest the importance of large institutional shareholders 
in corporate governance and in the development of financial markets that foster independent 
auditing. 
 
While previous research focuses on examining the relationship between managerial ownership and 
agency costs, we investigate the identity of the owners and relate the ownership structure to 
mandatory external audits in the context of a concentrated ownership in a transitional economy. 
Our results provide evidence of the active monitoring role of institutional investors (Pound 1988; 
Shleifer and Vishny 1986) and have important implications for policy makers in China. China should 
diversify its state ownership and introduce other forms of large external shareholders, including 
institutional investors, to improve the efficiency of China's stock markets, the effectiveness of 
corporate governance, and the credibility of accounting information. From the accounting 
perspective, the study suggests that in the absence of the institutional features typically found in 
free-market economies that provide incentives for managers to supply credible accounting 
information via quality audits, the introduction of large institutional shareholders can be a good 
alternative for transition. Our results also illustrate the need for policymakers in other transitional 
economies to understand how ownership reforms provide incentives for managers to supply 
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credible accounting information via independent auditing before prescribing a comprehensive set 
of rules and regulations for corporate reporting. 
 
Footnote 
1 For example, the largest shareholder of Fangxiang Guangdian Ltd. (Stock No. 000757) was 
Neijiang State Assets Management Bureau, which held 50 percent of the firm's total shares 
outstanding at the end of 2001. The firm's board of directors was then composed of five members 
representing the state interest and two members acting for institutional investors. When the firm 
sold all of its state shares to institutional investors in July 2002, the board of directors was completely 
dominated by institutional representatives. 
 
2 We follow the traditional approach to measure auditor size based on the book value of the 
clientele's assets; as state shares cannot be traded, no data on the market value of shares held by 
government agencies are available. Furthermore, without taking the natural logarithm, the mean 
ratio, standard deviation, variance, and skewness of the dependent variable are 2.159, 3.270, 10.692, 
and 4.038, respectively. The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test suggest that the null hypothesis 
that the data follow a normal distribution be rejected at the 1 percent level. After the log 
transformation, the mean, standard deviation, variance and skewness are 0.081, 1.217, 1.482, and -
0.270, respectively. The results of normality tests (Shapiro WiIk and Kolmogorov-Smirnov) suggest 
that the data are from a lognormal distribution. In addition, the transformation also corrects for 
heteroscedasticity caused by differences in raw values. 
 
3 DeFond (1992) and Francis and Wilson (1988) both control for new stock issues that may involve 
marketing the firms' new issues to outsiders through auditor change. In our sample, 98 percent of 
firms had no new issues in the year of auditor change. As new issues are not systematically related 
to the dependent variable, leaving them out will not confound the test results. Similarly, to examine 
the possible effect of audit fees on auditor switching in China, we compare the audit fees of 85 
switching companies that voluntarily disclosed their audit fees for 2000 and 2001. We find that these 
companies paid comparatively higher audit fees after their auditor switchesby an average of 
RMB83.800 (approximately U.S.$10,000) per engagement. We obtain similar results when comparing 
the pre- and post-switch audit fees of 56 companies that disclosed audit fees for both 2001 and 2002. 
Therefore, audit fees do not appear to be a factor for our sample firms to change auditors (Chan et 
al. 2006). 
 
4 The significantly negative correlation between ΔState and ΔInstitutions suggests, perhaps not 
surprisingly, that the percentage increase in institutional shares was directly attributable to the 
decrease in the proportion of state shares. Except for the correlation between ΔState and 
ΔInstitutions, other correlations among the independent variables are below 0.23. 
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5 Over the sample period, there were 7, 9, 1, and 113 clients switching from a Non-Big 4 auditor to 
a Big 4 auditor, from a Big 4 auditor to a Non-Big 4 auditor, from a Big 4 auditor to another Big 4 
auditor, and from a Non-Big 4 auditor to another Non-Big 4 auditor, respectively. Insufficient 
switches to Big 4 auditors prevent us from running the affiliation model based on this classification 
of auditors. 
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